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Divided Education: Divergent 
Historiographies and Shared  
Discursive Practices
This chapter will show how the interpretations of the local past diverge 
between Bosniak and Croat historians. At the same time it will also reveal 
how historians on both sides draw on similar discursive strategies when 
narrating a national meta-narrative. These meta-narratives can best be 
described as goal-oriented, while Chaps. 4–6 will illustrate how the indi-
vidual narratives can better be described as target-seeking. The national 
and the personal narratives can only be analytically divided. In reality 
they are tightly entangled. The national narratives dominant in the public 
discourse serve as reference points for individuals in many specific ways. 
They support, manoeuvre around and/or contest them. On the other 
hand, the dominant public discourse is carried on and enacted by the 
same individuals.
A dominant public discourse has been described as a political practice 
that ‘establishes, sustains and changes power relations, and the collective 
entities (classes, blocs, communities, groups) between which power rela-
tions obtain’ (Fairclough 1992: 67). Discourses contribute to the construc-
tion of ‘social identities’, of ‘social relations’ and of systems of knowledge 
and belief (see Fairclough 1992). However, a discourse can never be 
entirely captured, since it is always in the making. It is a simplification to 
speak of the Bosniak or the dominant Croat discourse as ‘[c]apturing a 
discourse in its totality is impossible, both because it is circulated in differ-
ent kinds of written, oral and performed texts, and because it is continu-
ally evolving’ (Purdeková 2008: 509). This point is particularly relevant in 
BiH, where history is still, so to speak, in the process of being (re)written. 
Clearly, historiography is not static anywhere, but it is even less so after great 
political changes, such as those following the disintegration of Yugoslavia, 
where revising historiography has become a crucial way of legitimising new 
political elites. However, next to the dominant public discourses, voices of 
dissent can be heard. Even though these counter-voices are less powerful, 
they clearly matter, for example, within the media, academia, the arts and 
among different non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and less organ-
ised parts of civil society. In addition, there are dissenting or antithetical 
voices among the politicians themselves.
Referencing the local past is central to the dominant public discourses 
as it serves political goals. The past is used to legitimise certain ideologi-
cal views on the present and on coexistence in Mostar. For example, the 
way national groups are presented as primordial entities that are crucially 
different from one another leaves little space for Mostarians to define 
themselves other than along national lines (Palmberger 2013).
Nationalist politicians and the nationalist-orientated media continue 
to dominate BiH, fuelling distrust among people. But the nationalisa-
tion of history is not only promoted by the political elites and the media. 
What makes it so effective in BiH is the plurality of channels through 
which it is promoted (see Donia 2010; Torsti 2003). Besides the media 
and politicians’ speeches, the nationalisation of history is also very actively 
supported by a considerable number of academic scholars and through 
public commemorations, memorial culture and the education system(s). 
Education has been said to be one of the main state-controlled redistri-
butions of history (see Wertsch 2002); this is particularly obvious in a 
post-war context like BiH (see Hill 2011).
Still, we need to reflect critically on the influence education (including 
textbooks) has on the Post-Yugoslav generation. Even if we can clearly 
see how history is manipulated in the educational context, this does not 
mean that students fully surrender to the national discourses they are 
exposed to, as shown in this chapter and in Chap. 6. Vuckovic (2012) 
shows in the case of members of the Croat post-war generation that they 
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evaluate Yugoslavia mostly in positive terms, particularly regarding social 
life, despite the negative presentations of Yugoslavia in Croatian textbooks. 
This suggests that we should not underestimate memories transmitted by 
older family members (Vuckovic 2012: 197), especially memories con-
cerning social aspects of Yugoslavia that are widely omitted from textbooks.
 Institutionalising Mostar’s Division:  
Divided Education
In 2007, the University of Zenica in Mostar proposed plans to open a 
Department of Preschool Education within the Islamic teachers’ training 
faculty. This triggered a discussion on whether such a move was legitimate 
or if such early religious education constitutes indoctrination and is just 
another mechanism of national segregation. The debate between propo-
nents and opponents of religious pre-school education involved local as 
well as international actors, and attracted a lot of media attention. The 
international community, and in particular the Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE),1 expressed concerns over these devel-
opments. The OSCE justifies its active engagement in the education sector 
with its belief that the status quo has negative consequences for (re-)build-
ing a nationally diverse society, as expressed in the following statement: 
‘Children educated in monoethnic environments will likely be poorly pre-
pared for life in such a country, let alone in an increasingly diverse Europe’ 
(OSCE 2007a: 6; see also OSCE 2007e).2 The OSCE’s intervention trig-
gered strong reactions by Muslim clerics. Reisu-l-ulema Mustafa ef. Cerić 
accused the OSCE of interference in child education, which in his view 
should remain the business of the family (Oslobodjenje, 4 September 2007).
Even if the debate outlined above revolved around the subject of Islamic 
pre-school education, it was never much concerned with questions of 
1 The OSCE is the international organisation which most actively engages with the education sec-
tor in BiH. The head office in Sarajevo and the field offices, such as the one in Mostar, all had their 
own education departments until they became part of a larger ‘Human Dimensions’ department 
in 2010.
2 The idea that education is an instrument and a resource for promoting respect for diversity is 
regarded as a ‘Western’ idea rooted in the enlightenment tradition (Höpken 2002: 11).
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faith but rather—almost exclusively—with the question of nationality. 
This is because the education system in Mostar, as elsewhere in the coun-
try, is divided along national rather than religious lines. Even if the two 
(religious and national) identities often overlap, it is the national rather 
than the religious motivation that makes many politicians, teachers 
and parents support a separate education system. In the case of Mostar, 
the segregation of children and youth from kindergarten to university 
 institutionalises the city’s division and raises a generation with hardly any 
encounters with their national counterparts (see Chap. 6).
In order to maintain national separatism, pupils in BiH are taught 
in separated classes using different curricula. More than three different 
curricula exist; the Federation of BiH already has several curricula, with 
one issued by the Federation Ministry of Education and others issued 
by the ministries of different cantons. A separate curriculum exists for 
the Republika Srpska and Brčko District. With the exception of Brčko 
District, all curricula show a particular national orientation (OSCE 
2007a: 6; see also OSCE 2007d; Swimelar 2013). In Mostar, schools 
follow a curriculum either in the Bosniak or in the Croat language.3 Since 
there is no school following the curriculum in the Serb language, parents 
with a Serb background send their children to either a Bosniak- or Croat- 
dominated school. The choice is usually influenced by the location of 
the school, and as no Serb-dominated schools are provided, the school is 
often chosen based on proximity.4
In principle, children, regardless of their national background, may 
attend any given school. As most of the schools are dominated by one 
nation, minority pupils are usually expected to accept a nationally biased 
curriculum. Provided there is a sufficient number of minority students, 
students are entitled to attend separate classes for the national group in 
subjects such as language, history, geography and religion.5 However, this 
3 Staff of the OSCE education department told me that the politically correct way to differentiate 
between the curricula is by referring to the language they are based on. This was also confirmed to 
me by students who used the terms Bosniak/Croat/Serb curriculum.
4 Serb students are offered Orthodox religious education by a mobile teacher responsible for Serb 
students in the region.
5 ‘The Implementation Plan of the 5 March 2002 Interim Agreement on Accommodation of 
Specific Needs and Rights of Returnee Children stipulates that all schools shall organize classes 
from the national group of subjects, provided that parents and students opt to have the national 
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separate teaching is provided only in rare cases. For this and other rea-
sons, parents of minority status prefer their children to attend schools run 
by co-nationals, even if they have to accept long commutes. But there is 
also a small number of parents whose children attend classes with pupils 
of other national backgrounds. In conversations with parents, I learned 
that the reasons for such a decision are manifold and range from practical 
considerations to issues to do with the reputation of the school. In this 
discussion on separate education systems, it is important to remember 
that there are children from mixed marriages or children of parents with 
weak national identification, although far fewer than in pre-war Mostar 
(see Palmberger 2013).
Returning to international actors’ engagement with questions of edu-
cation in Mostar once more, it is interesting to note that the international 
community has not always propagated a common education system in 
the way it does now. In the immediate post-war years, the international 
community saw the provision of a separate education system as a nec-
essary prerequisite to motivate refugees to return to their hometown. 
Although this was regarded as only a temporary solution, it showed 
how long-lasting the effects were for segregated schools but also for ‘two 
schools under one roof ’. The latter have two directors, two teacher coun-
cils, two student councils, two curricula and separate textbooks in the 
respective national languages (Ashton 2007: 11).
The staff of the international organisations who were involved in sup-
porting two schools under one roof are aware of the paradoxical situation 
they have created. Over coffee, two local OSCE staff joked about it and 
one of them told me: ‘Here in Mostar we do not have problems with two 
schools under one roof because we have two schools under two roofs.’ It 
is true that in Mostar (unlike, for example, the nearby town of Stolac) 
the ‘two schools under one roof ’ model has not been applied very much. 
Still, the most famous school that is structured on this model is situated in 
Mostar. The Old Grammar School, Stara gimnazija, was—as all schools 
were in pre-war BiH—a mixed school before the war. With great effort 
and the support of the international community, in particular the OSCE, 
group of subjects taught according to a curriculum that is different from that already being taught’ 
(OSCE 2007a: 5).
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attempts were made to reunite the school after the war (see Hromadžić 
2015). Because the case of Stara gimnazija exemplifies the deadlocked situ-
ation so well and also because some of the Post-Yugoslavs introduced in 
Chap. 6 attended the school, I will briefly introduce the school here.6
Opened in 1898, Stara gimnazija has been housed continuously in a 
lovely Habsburg building, with an interruption during and shortly after 
the war. Before the war the school’s excellent reputation was known in 
BiH and throughout the other republics of Yugoslavia. To this day, its 
pupils are proud to be a part of this school. Situated at the former front-
line, Stara gimnazija was destroyed during the war. A few years after the 
war ended, the Croats rebuilt a few classrooms and claimed ownership 
of the school. The pre-war Bosniak students were taught in one of the 
primary schools instead, taking shifts with the primary school children 
(Ashton 2007: 8). Today, Stara gimnazija is administratively unified but 
students are still taught under two curricula. However, the school offers 
joint extra-curricular activities and recently the first integrated classes 
were launched (Ashton 2007: 4).
Hromadžić (2008) describes the school as an outcome of the Dayton 
Peace Agreement:
The school embodies the paradoxical spirit of the Dayton Peace Agreement, 
where simultaneous segregation (in the name of ethnic groups’ survival) 
and unification (in the name of democratization, reconciliation, and the 
common national identity) of citizens take place. New forms of schools 
and youth—not fully integrated but not segregated, either—emerge from 
the collision. (Hromadžić 2008: 20)
Even if the Dayton Peace Agreement does not name the right to sepa-
rate education, the agreement nevertheless leaves the central government 
in a weak position and the constitution emphasises national prerogatives 
rather than individual rights. Nevertheless more integration and mixing 
among the pupils of Stara gimnazija could be observed in the last couple 
of years. In an interview survey (Ashton 2007) with students from Stara 
6 I obtained information on recent developments of Stara gimnazija as well as on grander developments 
in the education sector of BiH in interviews with staff from the OSCE education department in 
Sarajevo and Mostar.
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gimnazija, those surveyed expressed little concern over mingling with 
students from the other curricula. Most students, moreover, did not per-
ceive the prospect of united classes as a threat to their national identity. 
The report concludes:
The Gymnasium Mostar students interviewed had moved over three 
years from support of separate languages to believing that language was a 
‘silly’ thing to be fighting over. This did not happen because they were 
forced to integrate language in school, but because they made contact 
with each other and, over time, began to accept each other’s language. 
(Ashton 2007: 39)
The fears, the author of the report suggests, come more from the parents 
than from the students, so in fact joint activities among the parents would be 
needed to help overcome the barriers and scepticism (Ashton 2007: 32).7 
These observations support the idea that encounters between Bosniaks 
and Croats—be they as limited as in the case of the pupils at Stara gim-
nazija—do make a difference.8 Conversely, the lack of possible encoun-
ters and contact is likely to foster prejudices and mistrust (see Hewstone 
et al. 2005; Lederach 1997) (Fig. 3.1).
Stara gimnazija is an isolated case in Mostar. The remaining schools 
keep to the separation promoted by the political elites, particularly by 
Croats. The language issue is taken as the core argument, whereby it is 
claimed that children can only learn proper Croatian if taught in mono- 
national schools. In this discourse, the right to be taught in Croatian is 
a necessity in preventing assimilation. The OSCE counters such claims 
by referring to the Dayton Peace Agreement, which—although based on 
national rather than individual rights—does not include a right to be 
7 I was also able to observe how the fears and barriers rather were on the side of the parents than the 
teachers during my previous research in Brčko. Since the 2002 school year, in Brčko, students are 
together for more than 80 % of the time and only national group subjects are taught separately (see 
OSCE 2007d: 29). After overcoming initial difficulties, Brčko’s education system today has a very 
good reputation and even students from across the border come to Brčko for their education.
8 Creating opportunities for young people to meet is a central aim of some of the youth NGOs in 
Mostar, such as the youth centres OKC Abrašević, Nansen Dijalog Centar (Nansen Dialogue Centre) 
and Mladí most (The Young Bridge)—as I learned in interviews with these youth centres’ staff and 
from regular visitors. The events I attended at these centres proved successful, even though only a 
small percentage of Mostar’s youth participated in their projects.
3 Divided Education 97
taught in one’s language: ‘While the right to learn one’s own language 
is guaranteed, there is no guarantee in any convention or in the BiH 
and Entity constitutions that peoples have the right to be taught in a 
particular language’ (Ashton 2007: 9). Yet we should be aware that the 
position of the international community towards the language issue is 
itself ambivalent. For example, on the one hand the OSCE does not sup-
port the idea that children should be taught in their respective languages, 
while on the other hand all official OSCE documents (and its website) 
are written in all three official languages: Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian. 
This OSCE practice strongly signals the need for linguistic separatism.
Aside from language, the curriculum acts as another strong boundary 
marker. Even if textbook commissions have ‘cleansed’ the textbooks of 
obvious offensive content towards co-nationals, it does not mean that 
current textbooks are not biased. In 2008, an analysis of 20th-century 
Fig. 3.1 Stara gimnazija, the Old Grammar School in 2008. Photo by the 
author
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history textbooks for the final primary school grades was launched by 
the Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research. The report 
of the analysis reveals that the quality of the textbooks differs greatly in 
respect to the Guidelines for writing and evaluation of history textbooks for 
primary and secondary schools in BiH adopted in 2006. One of the cen-
tral  principals of the Guidelines states that the region and the country 
of BiH have to be the main reference points in the textbooks (see Karge 
2008: 22). The selected textbooks used for the curriculum in Croatian 
and Serbian ignore this guideline and instead take as their reference point 
Croatia or Serbia, respectively. Textbooks taking BiH as their reference 
point, however, are similarly biased by tending to focus on Bosniak 
history rather than presenting a balanced account of the history of all 
the nations in BiH. This analysis also corresponds with my observa-
tions during history lectures at Mostar’s two universities discussed later 
in this chapter.
At present, the war of the 1990s is not part of the curriculum in most of 
the cantons of the Federation of BiH, but is part of the curriculum in the 
Republika Srpska (Karge 2008). Most of the cantons of the Federation 
of BiH follow a recommendation by the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe expressed in 2000 that suggests excluding the war of 
1992–1995 from the schools’ curriculum. This does not mean, however, 
that textbooks do not deal with the recent war at all, but they do so 
in very different ways. The space provided for such a discussion varies 
greatly, as does the quality of historical analysis. The fact that even the 
date given for the outbreak of the war in BiH differs says a lot. While the 
textbooks identifiable as Bosniak-biased and Serb-biased date the out-
break of the war to the day of the EU’s recognition of BiH, the textbook 
identifiable as Croat-biased gives a much earlier date, namely 5 October 
1991, when an attack against the Croat-dominated village of Ravno in 
Eastern Herzegovina was launched by JNA forces (see Karge 2008).
Even if the war in the 1990s is not covered in the curriculum of 
Canton 7 (the canton to which Mostar belongs), it is likely that discus-
sion of the war finds its way into the classroom. Regardless of the content 
of the textbook, its use is up to the teacher. We can assume that in both 
directions—towards a balanced understanding or towards separatism—
teachers find a great spectrum of possibilities in what and what not to 
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teach their students.9 As I observed in Mostar, teachers would often bring 
a whole school class to attend a commemoration ceremony, most of which 
were in remembrance of the 1992–1995 war. This was, for example, the 
case in Mostar on 14 June 2006 when an exceptional history lesson took 
place under the Old Bridge. In order to illustrate the way in which his-
tory is taught to students at commemorations and how memories are 
transferred from the older generations to the younger, let us take a closer 
look at this particular commemoration ceremony.
My notes from my Mostar field diary on 14 June 2006 state:
An exceptional history lesson is taking place under the Stari most today. 
What makes it exceptional is not only the location but the choice of ‘history 
teacher’. The event is being organised by the Army of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (ABiH) and the ‘history teacher’ is one of the former soldiers 
who fought for the ABiH during the war between 1992 and 1995. The 
event is one of a series of events to celebrate the liberation from Serbian- 
Montenegrin aggression and is announced as a ‘history lesson’.
It is a bright, sunny day and I arrive a bit early at the Šehitluci (martyrs’ 
cemetery, Fig. 3.3) waiting for the pupils and teachers to arrive. All the 
children who arrive have a red carnation in their hands. Soon the crowd 
grows and it becomes a noisy, cheerful gathering. Kids are very excited, 
talking to each other, giggling and waving their flowers in the air. The 
excursion seems to be a welcome change; nothing yet reminds us of the 
serious purpose behind the event. A handful of soldiers and the imam 
stand out amid the cheerful youngsters. A few children have wreaths in 
their hands, waiting to lay them on the martyrs’ graves.
The cheerful noises quieten down once the official ceremony begins 
and a soldier lays a wreath at the martyr’s grave while the imam says a 
9 Although this section has concentrated on the aspects of a divided education system, it does not 
mean that this is the only problem students face. Students and parents have expressed to me great 
dissatisfaction with teaching methods as well as school facilities. One tremendous shortcoming is 
the lack of space, and it is not uncommon that secondary school children are taught in primary 
schools, especially in East Mostar (see OSCE 2007c, n.d.). Despite the defects of the education 
system in BiH, there are also pupils from families in economically disadvantaged situations who are 
not able to attend school at all (see OSCE 2007b).
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short prayer. Afterwards the imam addresses the children by telling them 
that the soldiers of ABiH gave their lives for their future, for their tomor-
row and their fortune. ‘We will never forget them!’ he announces with 
such pathos that it comes across rather as, ‘We are never allowed to forget 
them!’, pointing towards the graveyard where these words are inscribed on 
a plaque. ‘You have to listen carefully to what you hear in school and you 
should never forget!’, he tells the young audience. ‘It does not matter if it is 
written down in books or not, Tuđman was our enemy!’, he concludes and 
invites the pupils to join him in the history lesson under the Stari most.
The crowd moves from the cemetery through Stari grad (Old Town) 
to Stari most. The long caravan of children wave their red carnations in 
excitement. Arriving on top of the bridge, they let the carnations sail 
down into the Neretva River, which soon turns into a sea of red flowers.
After crossing the bridge, the pupils pass the stone-carved sign, 
‘DON’T FORGET ‘93’ (written in English, Fig. 3.2). The memorial 
Fig. 3.2 A memorial stone at the Old Bridge. Photo by the author
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stone reinforces what the imam has just told them. Not all pupils seem 
to notice it, but some do and point in the direction of the stone with 
their carnations. The caravan moves down to the riverbed to a stage from 
which loudspeakers burst out popular folk music. The children’s excite-
ment increases from being so close to the water. Some of them have little 
BiH flags in their hands. Listening to the music being played, I notice 
that it is a song about Tuđman, accursed enemy of beautiful BiH. After 
two men dive from the bridge into the river (an old tradition associ-
ated first and foremost with Mostar’s pre-war identity and which today is 
almost exclusively practised by Bosniaks), the ceremony reaches its peak, 
the announced history lesson. A man in his early 50s takes the stage and 
address the audience:
I wish to tell you a story (priča) today. A true story with a beginning and an 
end. So far you have heard different kinds of stories. Stories that began 
Fig. 3.3 The imam with pupils at Šehitluci (martyrs’ cemetery), 2006. Photo 
by the author
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with ‘once upon a time, behind seven mountains and seven seas’. This kind 
of story you will not hear from us today. Our story has a real beginning, has 
a date, a day and time: 14 June 1992, one of the most important days in 
the history of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the entire thousand-year old his-
tory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The soldier continues by introducing himself as one out of many ABiH 
soldiers. By claiming that he is only one of many, he suggests that soldiers were 
not fighting as individuals but as a collective; from this point his story is 
the story of the ABiH or of ‘the’ brave soldier. From the  beginning, the 
speaker makes clear that he is not only a teacher of history but, more 
importantly, a participant (učesnik) of history. This gives him the legiti-
macy to speak about the past. Moreover, his words seem to suggest that 
he, as a frontline soldier, really saw what happened, in contrast to those 
civilians who stayed at home. He embeds the day, 14 June 1992, within a 
question about the wider history of BiH. The day of the liberation from 
Serbian- Montenegrin forces occupying Mostar is described as one of the 
most meaningful days in the long struggle for independence of BiH and 
the freedom of the Bosniak nation. But before finally achieving indepen-
dence, the Bosniak nation once again became a victim. The victory of 
the day in question against Serb forces is narrated by the speaker as the 
beginning of Croat aggression:
The entire left bank of our beauty [Neretva River], meaning this part 
which lies behind us, was occupied and all people, good people, had to 
leave their homes. On 13 June 1992, the first crossing of the River Neretva 
succeeded. When we arrived, our two blessed [here the old Turkish expres-
sion rahmetli is used] friends waved their flags with the lilies on it, flags 
which I see in your hands. And we thought that it was the end of aggression 
against our city. But as we soon learned it was the beginning, the begin-
ning of a heroic fight […].
In this part of the speech, it becomes clear that the Bosniaks are portrayed 
as the victims but also that the soldiers fighting back against the aggres-
sors are the new heroes. When referring to the beauty of the Neretva, the 
speaker anchors the nation’s identity in nature. The Neretva River is the 
natural beauty that persists even when dark forces are trying to destroy it. 
It is ‘our’ (the Bosniaks’, not the Croats’) Neretva, which, together with 
3 Divided Education 103
the Stari most, constitutes two strong identifiers for the Bosniak nation. 
The flags in the children’s hands serve as the symbolic link between the 
children and the past. Although the speaker refers to the lilies on their 
flags, the lilies are no longer on the official flag of BiH, the flags the chil-
dren hold in their hands. Since the fleur-de-lis is closely associated with 
the Muslim population it could not remain on BiH’s flag, so it gave way 
to a nationally neutral flag that was adopted in 1998 under the authority 
of the High Representative.
The day in question was the beginning of a heroic fight for liberation 
to allow the young generation to live a free life, the soldier continues. 
Only owing to the heroic deeds of the battalion ABiH 401, 41st brigade, 
can the pupils live in a free city. It soon becomes clear, though, that this 
privilege is not free of demands, but requires responsibility and gratitude 
from the youngest generation. The mission that the youngest generation 
is entrusted with is formulated by the soldier in an authoritarian tone: 
‘You should never allow anyone to do to you what was done to us!’—
suggesting that the war affected only the older generation and at the same 
time asking for lifelong gratitude towards the veterans and martyrs. In 
the speech, the speaker indicates that not only the ABiH but also the 
Islamic faith saved the Bosniak nation and therefore the youngsters are 
asked to pray whenever they pass martyrs’ graves.
At the end of the speech, the soldier appeals to the young genera-
tion to listen to their parents and teachers (implying that they know the 
truth, unlike some books, as suggested earlier) and to take it into their 
own hands to fight against evil and dark forces (sile zla, sile mraka) so that 
history does not repeat itself. Although the dark forces are never named, 
it is clear throughout the speech where they are located, and in order to 
erase any remaining doubts, the song with the words ‘Tuđman is our enemy’ 
in its refrain is played at full volume once more at the end of the speech.
The central message of the soldier to the pupils was simple: there 
are good people (we Bosniaks) and there are bad people (Serbs and 
Croats), and even if we have won the fight we have to remain vigilant 
in the future. The entire history lesson had one clear goal, namely to 
strengthen the sense of a Bosniak nation and to reinforce the division 
between Bosniaks and Croats (and Serbs). Although it was (at least in 
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the announcement) intended to be a commemoration celebrating the 
end of Serb-Montenegrin aggression, the event was clearly used first and 
foremost as a reminder of the Croat aggression that was portrayed as a 
danger until this day.
Dubravka Ugrešić, a Croat writer who in 1993 went into exile to 
escape nationalist politics in her home country, refers to such com-
memorations as ‘terror[s] of memory’. Such events are evoked in order to 
re- install the continuity of national identity (Ugrešić 1998: 123; see also 
Van der Veer 2002). The national memory is thereby narrated through 
the central dichotomy of a collectively threatened body (us) versus a 
collectively threatening body (them) (Ugrešić 1998: 117). Considering 
the riots that took place the night before the commemoration—when 
Croat hooligans, after losing against Brazil in the World Cup champion-
ship, rioted around the Bulevar and eventually picked a fight with their 
Bosniak counterparts—it was probably easy for the pupils to make the 
connection to where the ‘dark forces’ might be located. Although this 
incident was clearly related to hooliganism, the local and international 
media described it as renewed ‘ethnic violence’ in Mostar, reinforcing fear 
and division in the city.
In order to further analyse the national dominant discourses and the 
discursive strategies employed to support it, in the remainder of the 
chapter I mainly draw on material gathered from a range of different 
university lectures on the history of BiH (and Croatia) in the 20th cen-
tury held at the Bosniak-dominated Univerzitet Džemal Bijedić Mostar 
and the Croat-dominated university Sveučiliste u Mostaru in 2006. My 
data is also based on conversations and interviews I conducted with 
historians and students of history. So far, research on the role educa-
tion plays in propagating nationalist thinking in BiH has concentrated 
on textbooks (see, for example, Karge 2008; Torsti 2003) rather than 
the way in which history is taught in the classroom. While in text-
books only the historiography presented by a particular author can be 
analysed, in the classroom we can observe rhetorical means as well as 
moments of contestation. By including the interaction between lectur-
ers and students at the two universities, we can also learn more about 
cross-generational dialogue.
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 Rewriting History and Placing the Nation
In the foreword to his book Myths and Boundaries in South-Eastern Europe 
Pål Kolstø writes:
Groups that share the same history often interpret their common experi-
ences in radically different, sometimes diametrically opposite ways. The 
stories they tell about themselves and others—autostereotypes and hetero-
stereotypes—may all be based somehow on historical ‘facts’, but are so 
radically embellished that they hardly resemble each other any longer. 
(Kolstø 2005: vii)
This description greatly resembles my experiences when attending lec-
tures on the history of BiH (and Croatia) in the 20th century at the 
two universities in Mostar, when I participated in commemorations, 
and the observations I made through reading local newspapers and 
watching TV reports on the local past. During my participant observa-
tion at the two universities, I sometimes had to hurry from one univer-
sity to the other between lectures. On arriving at the university on the 
‘other side’, it felt as if whole worlds lay between the historiographies I 
heard in the respective lecture halls.
As briefly mentioned above, two universities have existed in Mostar 
since the war: Univerzitet Džemal Bijedić Mostar (mainly referred to as 
Džemal Bijedić here) on the east side, and Sveučiliste u Mostaru (mainly 
referred to as Sveučiliste, meaning ‘university’ in Croatian) on the west 
side. At the former, the majority of students are Bosniaks and a number 
of the professors are affiliated with the University of Sarajevo. At the lat-
ter, most students are Bosnian Croats, but there are also a number of stu-
dents as well as professors from Croatia. From the Bulevar dividing East 
and West Mostar, a street lined with old trees leads to Sveučiliste. Many 
cafés are situated along the street and posters adorn the old trees, mak-
ing students aware of upcoming student parties and pubs with special 
student offers. Sveučiliste is located only around 50 metres away from the 
Partisan memorial cemetery and some hundred metres from the football 
stadium, which in the eyes of the Bosniak population was unjustly taken 
away from Mostar’s pre-war football club Velež (previously a  multinational 
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club and today Mostar’s Bosniak football club; see Mills 2010). 
In the meantime it has become the home stadium for the West Mostar 
football club Zrinski, the arch-rival of Velež. Due to its national affiliation 
Zrinski had been forbidden and disbanded in socialist Yugoslavia but was 
re-established in 1992 with a ceremony held in Medjugorje, the Marian 
pilgrimage place.
So Sveučiliste is in-between two highly contested places, the Partisan 
memorial cemetery and the football stadium. The former is contested 
first and foremost by Croats because it ‘worships’ the socialist heroes, 
while the latter is contested mainly by Bosniaks who claim entitlement 
to the place. The third highly contested place is the building of Sveučiliste 
itself. Sveučiliste is based in the pre-war university building whose premises 
were used as a prison camp during the recent war.10 Although this part 
of the building’s history is not visible, other signs of its past are recognisable. 
For example, one of the lecture halls at the time still housed a world map 
in Cyrillic letters, a leftover from the old university. It seemed even more 
out of place when considering the pictures on the wall next to it, display-
ing Christian themes central to Croats’ self-understanding. For example, 
one of the pictures was titled, ‘Pokrštenje Hrvata’, meaning ‘Baptism of 
Croats’.
Sveučiliste, which prides itself as being the only Croatian-language uni-
versity in BiH, sees its roots in the Franciscan Theological School, which 
was founded in the late 19th century and closed in 1945. This affilia-
tion with the Franciscans is also visible in Sveučiliste’s logo, which shows 
the building of the Franciscan Monastery in Mostar. Sveučiliste receives 
considerable financial support from Croatia and is therefore much better 
equipped than its Bosniak counterpart. This close relation with Croatia 
was expressed in and reinforced by the large-scale reconstruction of the 
university buildings—begun at the end of my fieldwork—which was 
extensively funded by Croatia.
It is on the premises of Sveučiliste where the pre-war university (and 
Mostar’s only university back then) was located. When in 1993 war 
began between Croats and Bosniaks, the Croats took over the univer-
sity building and equipment. A group of Bosniak staff and students who 
10 This information I received in an interview with staff at one of the Bosniak detention camp 
victims organisations in Mostar.
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were able to flee to the left bank of the Neretva meanwhile continued to 
work in the memorial house Džemal Bijedić11 under extremely hostile 
conditions (Univerzitet Mostar 2002: 18). In 1994 the University Džemal 
Bijedić was relocated to the former Yugoslav Northern Camp army barracks 
(sjeverni logor), which had been heavily damaged during the first year of 
war. Thus the war was also tangible to me, not only in the presentations 
of the lecturer—where history was often examined from the perspective 
of the recent war—but also on the university’s premises. The classrooms 
only have basic equipment and do not provide sufficient heating during 
wintertime. On a rainy day, looking at the ruins through the barred win-
dow of one of the lecture halls is rather depressing. But when the sun is 
out, the former military camp turns into a lively university campus with a 
café packed with students in its centre and loud local rock music bursting 
from the speakers.
The history department was still very new when I did my fieldwork and 
the first students were expected to graduate in 2006. This relatively short 
history of the department, as well as the university as a whole, and its dif-
ficult start, were still noticeable during the time of my fieldwork. For exam-
ple, several times during my fieldwork, classes were cancelled without the 
students being informed in advance or indeed being informed at all. I had 
plenty of opportunities to interact with students outside of the classroom, 
joining them during coffee breaks and even making friends with students 
from different faculties. In these informal settings I also gained insight 
into the less enjoyable parts of their academic lives, which had to do with the 
poor university infrastructure (practical issues such as insufficient heating in 
classrooms, and more substantial concerns such as restricted access to litera-
ture) and the absence of some professors over long periods (as they often 
teach at other universities and only come to Mostar for limited periods).12
Although the two universities are divided along national lines, a group 
of minority students from the respective other side does exist. This ‘cross-
11 Džemal Bijedić was prime minister of Yugoslavia from 1971 until his death in an airplane crash 
in 1977. Born in Mostar, he had felt a special responsibility to put his home region back on the 
map. Under his influence, significant progress regarding the economy and higher education was 
made in Herzegovina. Due to his patronage, Mostar’s university, opened in 1977, was named after 
him.
12 For a critical assessment of the university system in BiH, see Weber 2007.
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ing’ is an academically strategic choice students make rather than a choice 
based on political considerations. For example, Sveučiliste did not offer 
computer sciences at first. So, the only option for students with a Croat 
background wanting to stay in Mostar but hoping to enrol in computer 
sciences was to study at Džemal Bijedić. From conversations with such 
students, I learned it was not always easy for them to convince their fami-
lies that this was the right thing to do. Parents were afraid that they would 
face harassment and discrimination on the ‘other side’. Another reason 
students gave for studying on ‘the other side’ was to avoid having to take 
a difficult entry exam. In the case of national subjects (such as Bosnian or 
Croatian language and history), however, the barrier seems insuperable 
even if it conflicts with personal interests. One young history student I 
met at a seminar for multi-perspective textbook writing told me he is 
most interested in the Ottoman period. But I was surprised to learn he 
was studying at Sveučiliste because I had thought that this period would 
be taught in more detail at Džemal Bijedić. Although the young historian 
confirmed my assumption, he made it very clear that he, as a Croat, 
would want to study history at Sveučiliste.
 Objectifying History
As Borneman states, historians are granted exceptional authority in 
speaking of the past:
Unlike an individual, a state has, of course, no memory by which it can 
reconstruct anything. It cannot at any point in time tell you its history, 
though historiographers may take it upon themselves, often with state 
approval, to do so. (Borneman 1992: 42–43)
In BiH, historians are the spokespeople not of the state, but rather of 
their respective nations. They are central actors in providing proof of 
the nation’s legitimate existence. For that reason, authors critical of such 
historians have referred to them as ‘ethno intellectuals’ (see, for example, 
Sekulić 1999: 283) or ‘national historians’ (Donia 2000: 358). They are 
given authority to speak about/for the nation’s past, and what they say 
possesses a strong normative value. Their authoritative power makes it easy 
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for their words to be exploited for political means. Following Bourdieu 
(1992: 116), I suggest we speak of the symbolic efficacy of the words of 
those people recognised by others as individuals holding authority:
The power of words is nothing other than the delegated power of the 
spokesperson, and his speech—that is, the substance of his discourse and, 
inseparably, his way of speaking—is no more than a testimony, and one 
among others, of the guarantee of delegation which is vested in him. 
(Bourdieu 1992: 107)
This authority to speak in the name of the nation was also emphasised by 
lecturers I encountered at the two universities. Generally a rather positivist 
approach towards history was taken. The lecturer has the authority to tell 
the students which historical interpretation is right and which is wrong.
This became most clear when a student’s view on history diverged from 
that of the lecturer. This was, for example, the case when a student at 
Sveučiliste compared the crimes committed by the NDH regime to those 
committed by the German Nazis. This caused the lecturer to interrupt 
the student by asking what literature he had actually consulted. The stu-
dent mentioned that one of his references was a source from the internet 
and the other a book, the title of which he read to the class. Thereupon 
the lecturer reprimanded the student for not having been critical enough 
in his literature review, claiming the literature and website consulted were 
nothing but propaganda. Trying to persuade his students to be more crit-
ical when consulting books, the lecturer explained that a book is not 
authoritative per se. He then began asking students whether they 
thought a nation’s fight for its rights was understandable. It was true that 
crimes were committed by the NDH, he admitted, but added that every 
national liberation struggle in history had been bloody: ‘What do you 
think? What would you do if you had to defend your nation?’ He then 
explained that the Serbs had positioned themselves against the Croats in 
WWII, while the Partisans had fought against the Nazis only to proclaim 
a communist revolution. The lecturer continued by saying that one can-
not only look at what had happened but always had to ask why some-
thing had happened as well. At the very end of the lecture, he once again 
looked straight into his students’ eyes and repeated his plea for a critical 
reading of historical documents.
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The lecturer made it clear to the student that his representation of his-
tory was not acceptable at all, first by criticising the choice of literature, 
then his uncritical reading of it, and finally the presenter’s analysis itself, 
as the student had only looked at the events and had not asked why the 
NDH had resorted to violence. In his explanation, the lecturer partially 
admitted that what the student had said was correct, although his inter-
pretation was not. In a conversation outside the classroom, the lecturer 
once told me that national identity becomes most important when it is 
threatened and that in contrast to well-established nations, such as France, 
nationalism in former Yugoslavia was still in its infancy. ‘How can one ask 
a 10 year old to behave like a 20 year old?’ he rhetorically asked me.
The lecturer’s unequivocal reaction shows that only one interpretation 
of history is acceptable in the class. This interpretation of history stands in 
stark contrast to the one taught in socialist Yugoslavia, where the NDH 
regime was referred to as the enemy within who collaborated with the 
Nazi oppressors (see Chap. 2). Instead, the lecturer’s interpretation is in 
line with that of the first president of Croatia (also a historian), Franjo 
Tuđman, who downplayed the number of victims of the NDH (see 
Campbell 1998). Similar to the lecturer’s argument above, Tuđman had 
stated that when looking back in history, one could see that all national lib-
eration movements were violent to some degree (the same argument is often 
made to justify or at least downplay the crimes committed by the HVO 
in the wars between 1991 and 1995).13 At the same time, when crimes 
committed by Croats are downplayed (or whenever possible, silenced) 
the victimisation of Croats is emphasised. For example, the dominant 
Croat public discourse claims that Tito discriminated against the Croat 
people because of the crimes committed by the NDH.
History was taught in a similar authoritarian and positivist fashion at 
Džemal Bijedić, even if there the opinion was upheld that history teach-
ing in BiH does not need to be separated along national lines. In an inter-
view I conducted with a lecturer of the history department at Džemal 
Bijedić, teaching 20th-century history, he clearly positioned himself 
13 With the election of Croatia’s new Prime Minister, Ivo Sanader, in 2003, and the political changes 
that followed his assumption of office, Croatia has taken a clear position regarding Jasenovac, con-
demning the crimes committed by the NDH regime. In 2004 a memorial site in Jasenovac was 
officially opened and representatives of the church, the Jewish community, as well as the Serb 
minority and the highest politicians of the country, were present (Melčić 2007: 558).
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against nationally biased historiography without questioning the idea of 
‘objective history’ as such. The lecturer promoted a history without 
(national) emotionality, based purely on facts. He indeed argued that 
science has to aim for objectivity and should not be misused for national 
chauvinistic purposes. He indicated that he had no categorical objections 
about the two universities in Mostar as long as they were not oriented along 
national lines. This lecturer’s perception was crucially different from that 
of the Croat lecturer’s discussed earlier in this chapter, who viewed the 
existence of a Croatian-language university as a crucial precondition 
for the national survival of the Croat people in BiH. However, it soon 
became clear that it is the historian who has the authority to claim his-
toric objectivity. In order to make the Bosniak lecturer’s position clearer, 
here is an excerpt from my interview with him:
Are there Croat students at your department?
I think we have some, but only a small and insufficient percentage. Why 
do I think this? History is a national subject and when it comes to national 
subjects like language, history and culture, students mostly believe that they 
can only study this subject at one of the two universities. My opinion, 
frankly, is that students of every nation, not only Croats or Serbs but other 
nations too, Jews… why not? They are welcome to study at this faculty. We 
are gaining knowledge of the history of Bosnia and Herzegovina. We 
decided right from the beginning that our knowledge of history has to be 
based on documents, not emotions. I’m always telling my students to 
exclude emotions. […] History is really sensitive in that sense and we are 
really trying to be careful not to include those emotions, no matter if this is 
a national subject; we have to analyse our history, our culture, and tradition 
on the basis of real facts. I don’t think only of Bosniaks in BiH, but of all 
nations, why not? All of that is our historical-cultural surrounding in which 
we have developed. We don’t gain knowledge of the history of Bosniaks or 
of Bosnian culture, we don’t have those subjects, our subject is history […].
Do you think objective history is possible?
Yes, why? Absolutely yes, why not? History is beautiful, if it is not mis-
used… could we have objective history? Well, if we are going to consider 
only science, only science and facts, if we are building only on these prem-
ises, we could reach objective history. We cannot have objective history if it 
is based on emotions without facts. I can say that I’m a Bosniak and I love 
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my nation and I will now write against the other nations and for my own 
people without any facts. If I don’t have documents for that or evidence, 
my writing is worthless. […] Here we have one true historical tragedy 
when we talk about Bosniaks, objectively one true tragedy that was always 
created by groups that didn’t have good intentions, not complete ethnic 
groups, but from those radical chauvinistic groups of the Serb and eventually 
the Croat nation. I will briefly go through the history […].
In this excerpt, the lecturer reinforces his disapproval of nationally divided 
universities. He claims that even so-called national subjects do not have to 
be taught separately so long as they are based on objective science. In the 
case of history, the lecturer argues that objective history is possible only if 
one excludes (national) emotions. If history is based on facts and excludes 
emotions, it can be objective and therefore attractive to all students regard-
less of their nationality. However, when we examine the last paragraph of 
the interview cited above, it becomes evident that the decision of what is 
defined as an objective fact lies solely with the respective historian. It is 
the authority his words are granted that enables him to claim objective 
history for himself while denying it to a national counterpart.
As will be explored further in the remainder of the chapter, the victi-
misation of the Bosniak people is at the centre of the Bosniak local his-
tory representation. This is also the point from which the lecturer begins 
his narration, as indicated in his last paragraph cited above, in which he 
legitimises what happened to the Bosniaks as objective historical fact by 
using phrases such as ‘historical tragedy’, a ‘true tragedy’ and ‘objectively 
one true tragedy’ in the same sentence. As I will explore in the next sec-
tion, the Bosniaks, unlike the Croats, do not draw the same conclusion 
about their perceived historical role as victims.
 National Aspirations and Connecting Different 
Historical Periods
At the university lectures I followed, generally little attention was paid to the 
atrocities committed by one’s own national group or to the atrocities expe-
rienced by others, while the victimisation of one’s own group took centre 
stage. ‘National historians have a propensity to characterize perpetrators 
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from their national group as renegades committing isolated acts, while 
perpetrators from rival groups are portrayed as acting out the historical 
will of the offending nationality’ (Donia 2000: 358). While the Bosniaks 
locate their victimhood first and foremost in the war of 1992–1995 and 
in the WWII period, the Croats locate it first and foremost in the time 
of Tito’s Yugoslavia, the 1992–1995 war and the post-war (post- 1995) 
period. Although I will focus on the accusations made by Bosniaks and 
Croats against each other, it is important to stress that Croats as well as 
Bosniaks make strong accusations against Serbs, too. The Serbs are pre-
sented as the initiators of the war by Croats and Bosniaks alike. However, 
since the present conflict lines in Mostar run between Bosniaks and Croats, 
little attention is paid to the third warring party, the Serbs. This is because 
the battle with the Serbs lies more in the past, while for people in Mostar 
the battle between Bosniaks and Croats is clearly situated in the present, 
refers to events in the past, and is all about the future.
In contrast to Sveučiliste where national liberation was proposed as the 
only path towards democracy, strong scepticism was expressed at Džemal 
Bijedić over the feasibility of constructing BiH as a nation-state. The 
claim that BiH has always been a multinational place and must remain 
one is central to the Bosniak-dominant public discourse. In the interview 
I conducted with the lecturer introduced above, this position becomes 
very clear:
Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot be constituted as a nation-state. Persistent 
attempts to create a nation-state here caused problems; today we have one 
monster of a state just because of this idea to create a nation-state. We can-
not create a nation-state because history doesn’t allow us to do that. We can 
create a civil state and that is the only way, there is no other!
In the Bosniak-dominant discourse, BiH is presented as a state that always 
has been and should therefore remain multinational. Faruk, another 
Bosniak historian, teaching history in one of Mostar’s secondary schools, 
put it in these words in an interview I conducted with him:
In reality, Bosnia has always been a multilateral community. What the 
European Union is today, a mixture (mješavina) of different nations, a 
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mixture, Bosnia has always been. Bosnia never has been unilateral. She has 
always been multilateral. […] The recent war put Bosnia in great danger. 
Why? Because a great percentage of local Serbs—Bosnian Serbs—and a 
great percentage of Bosnian Croats during this war began to turn against, 
to destroy and to fire at their mother, their Bosnia, their mother, their 
land, with the goal of killing an entire people, the Bosniaks. And that is a 
historical fact.
In this narrative, the Croats as well as the Serbs are polemically represented 
as traitors who have no respect for the nature of BiH, which is portrayed 
as multinational (see Alićehajić 2004). Croats and Serbs—or a great per-
centage of them, as Faruk put it—viewed the loss of the Bosniak people 
with complacency simply in order to achieve their goal of becoming a 
nation-state. Faruk backed up his last statement with the words ‘and that 
is a historical fact’.
A multinational and centralised state, supported by the two historians 
discussed above, is a central claim in the Bosniak-dominant public dis-
course, which is supported by the Bosniak politicians in power. A multi-
national and centralised state would also ensure Bosniaks, who are in the 
numerical majority, a privileged status. In addition, the desire for more 
centralisation is in line with EU regulations that also demand a more 
centralised state. On the other hand, the notion of such a state is heavily 
contested by BiH’s Croats as well as Serbs, who are afraid of losing power 
to the Bosniaks. While the Serbs insist on the continuation of the Serb 
Republic, key Croat political players demand more independence for 
the Croat population, sometimes expressed in the insistence on a Croat 
republic modelled after the already existing Serb Republic. The lecture 
series I attended at Sveučiliste communicated the opposite message from 
the one promoted by Bosniak historians: Croats have been suppressed 
throughout history and only national liberation ensures the freedom of 
the Croat nation. Thus local history was taught as a narrative of Croat 
suppression and their struggle to overcome it.
At Sveučiliste the period of Yugoslavia was central to the lecture series 
I attended; it was presented as a dark period that needed to be overcome 
in order to achieve national liberation. The lecturer who taught the lec-
ture series was not cagey about his negative feelings towards Yugoslavia. 
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He once told his students that one can only laugh at people who remem-
ber Yugoslavia nostalgically as he was sure they did so only because they 
were sentimental about the time they were young and healthy.
For the lecturer, the period of Yugoslavia was only about the sup-
pression of the Croat nation. He holds Tito responsible for trying to 
eliminate national identity through attempts to create a meta-ethnic 
nationalism. ‘Such a nationalism is a nice idea’, the lecturer said some-
what sarcastically, ‘but impossible to realise’. He told the students that at 
the beginning of the 1960s Tito gave in to political pressure and spoke 
publicly about nationalism for the first time although he was afraid that 
nationalism would lead to secession movements. Shortly afterwards, in 
1967, Tito granted the Muslim population a national identity.14 For 
the lecturer, this move by Tito, together with Serb dominance, further 
strengthened the oppression of the Croat nation. Another example he 
provided to underline the institutionalised disempowering of the Croat 
people was Tito’s apparent gerrymandering of municipality borders in 
order to prevent Croats from gaining a majority. The lecturer presented 
Tito to his students as a statesman who sought to erase national feelings; 
yet, so the lecturer argued, nationalism (national liberation) is crucial for 
achieving democracy.
In both the Bosniak- and Croat-dominant public discourses, the past is 
presented in such a way that it serves to legitimise the respective national 
aspirations. Therefore, as argued earlier in this book, representations of the 
past are likely to tell us more about the present state and about aspirations 
for the future than they actually tell us about the past itself. This is true in 
both Bosniak- and Croat-dominant discourses, where not only is the past 
represented in often diametrical ways, but so are the future aspirations of 
the respective nation. In order to validate the suffering of their own nation, 
different historical periods are strung into one coherent narrative, a narra-
tive of victimisation and suppression. It is indeed a central discursive strat-
egy in the Croat- as well as the Bosniak-dominant public discourse, and is 
also a tool heavily drawn upon in school history textbooks in BiH:
14 From then on people could choose the category Muslim (national) in the census while before 
they could only choose between Muslim (religious), undeclared or Yugoslav. Tito’s motivation for 
granting Muslims a national status was to counter-balance the nationalism of the two big nations 
(Serb and Croat) (Isakovic 2000: 80–81).
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Generally entire chapters […] could have been analysed from the point of 
view of how they serve to make the present more understandable by equal-
ising the past and the present. Numerous direct and indirect references 
across time construct the idea of historical continuity and reoccurrence 
when the construction of representations of nation, war and peace in the 
history textbooks is in question. This is true among all three communities. 
(Torsti 2003: 253)
Among local historians, a central discursive strategy was the linking of 
the recent with the more distant past, even if the latter was not officially 
the object of study. Numerous connections to the distant past were made 
in order to reinforce the ancient history of the Croat nation and to point 
out the animosities that Croats have faced throughout time. At the end of 
one lecture in which the national movement was discussed, the lecturer 
suggested a topic for the students’ final paper: the oppression of the Croat 
people, from the Ottoman Empire through to Tito’s Yugoslavia.
The lecturer painted a picture of the Croats as ‘a nation in captivity’ 
during the socialist era. The Croats are presented as a suppressed and dis-
criminated nation that was also economically exploited. This discourse is 
also dominant in Croat history textbooks (Dimou 2007: 131). Moreover, 
Croats are presented as truly liberal:
Croatian political identity is portrayed as primordially liberal and con-
versely, liberalism is identified as the essential political orientation of the 
Croatian nation. As a narrative strategy it is inserted with the intention to 
individualize Croatian history and remove any common frame of reference 
to the second Yugoslavia. (Dimou 2007: 140)
This strategy pointed out by Dimou implies that the Croats did not par-
ticipate in Tito’s socialist project whatsoever. In this national master nar-
rative, Croat liberation was realised with the Homeland War 1991–1995 
(domovinski rat) that led to Croatia’s independence (although indepen-
dence was only fully realised for the Croats in Croatia and not for the 
Croats in BiH). As evident later in this chapter and in some of my inter-
locutors’ narratives in Chaps. 4–6, the fear is that owing to the numerical 
minority of Croats in BiH, Croats will not be able to maintain their 
independence as a nation and, in the worst-case scenario, will disappear 
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altogether (through emigration and assimilation). This fear is taken as jus-
tification by Croats for claiming further national independence. From the 
time the Bosnian Croats gave up their hopes of joining Croatia, claims 
have been made for a separate Croat republic.
In the Bosniak-dominant public discourse, the linking of different 
historical periods is enacted in order to prove the continuous victimisa-
tion of the Bosniak people since the decline of the Ottoman Empire, 
with a short interruption during Tito’s Yugoslavia. Bosniaks are ascribed 
a victim status, while Croats and Serbs are presented as perpetrators 
who disregarded the Bosniaks as a distinct people and aimed to con-
quer them. In order to validate past Bosniak victimisation, the historians 
linked different historical periods. Sometimes the links are explicit, while 
at other times the leaping between different historical periods implies 
that there should be a correlation between them. The war in the 1990s 
thereby is presented as if it were only the latest historical example of 
Bosniak suffering and victimhood. In this narrative, the Croats and Serbs 
are perceived as threats to the Bosniak nation because of their denial of 
the latter’s independent existence. In contrast, Bosniaks present them-
selves as a nation that respects the other nations. Particularly prominent 
is the linking of WWII with the recent war. I will use one specific nar-
rative conveyed to me by the history teacher Faruk to demonstrate this 
linking strategy.
When narrating the local history of the 20th century, two concepts 
were predominant for Faruk: fascism and genocide. He made an explicit 
connection between WWII and the recent war, which for him were both 
initiated by Croat and Serb fascists who committed genocide but were 
finally defeated. Faruk told me that his elaborations on WWII were neces-
sary in order for me to understand the recent war in BiH. At one point 
during his narration he stated:
Serb nationalists, a horde of Chetnics, a fascist unit started a massive 
slaughter (klanje) against the Muslim residents. That was indeed awful; 
unfortunately it repeated itself 50 years later […].
Faruk cemented this link between the two wars because of the recurring 
importance of a specific date, which he took as proof that the recent 
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war was a repetition of WWII. He underpins the connection between 
the aggression against BiH/against the Bosniak nation (he uses the two 
interchangeably) by fascists during WWII and the war of 1992–1995, by 
calling attention to the date of 9 November:
Mostar first went through destruction performed by the Serb fascists, and 
then it went through destruction, an urbicide committed by HVO. And in 
this phase of aggression it came to the final destruction of the Old Bridge, I 
told you already a few days ago, 09 November 1993. This date is deliberately 
chosen. On the same day 60 [55!] years earlier, on 09 November 1938, the 
Kristallnacht (Night of Broken Glass) had taken place in Hitler’s Nazi 
Germany, which marked the beginning of the Holocaust against the Jews 
and everything that took place thereafter in occupied Europe. And on that 
date [09 November 1993] the Old Bridge in Mostar was destroyed! […] The 
destruction of the Old Bridge indeed was a sign for the Croat fascists that the 
Holocaust of the Bosniaks had begun like the Kristallnacht in Nazi Germany 
signalled the beginning of the Holocaust of the Jews. The destruction of the 
Old Bridge for them meant the elimination, the extermination of Bosniaks 
at the riverbank. But that is monstrous, because the Old Bridge is a symbol 
of Bosniaks, but also of Serbs and Croats and Jews and of the entire world!
The close connection Faruk draws between WWII and the recent war, 
and the way he presents Bosniaks as the victims (like the Jews during 
WWII), while presenting the Croats and Serbs as fascist aggressors 
(like the Nazis), is characteristic of the dominant Bosniak public dis-
course.15 In this discourse, the term ‘genocide’ is used freely for different 
kinds of atrocities committed against the Bosniak population. This is also 
common practice in Bosniak history textbooks (see Karge 2008: 15; see 
also Torsti 2003). The term genocide in textbooks is used not only for the 
killing of Bosniaks during 1992–1995, but also for the Ustaša policy that 
aimed to assimilate Bosniaks. Even the early years of the interwar king-
dom (1921–1929) are described as ‘political genocide of the Muslims’ 
(Ramet 2007). It is a common discursive strategy in Bosniak as well as 
in Croat and Serb textbooks to describe local history by using the same 
15 The close link drawn between the recent war and WWII also becomes visible in the commemora-
tions held on 9 May in East Mostar, at the so-called Victory Day over Fascism (Dan pobjede nad 
fašizmom).
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terms for different historical periods. In the case of the Bosniaks, text-
book authors suggest that the recent war can be explained (and perhaps 
could even have been foreseen) by events in the past, by the decade-long 
(or even century-long) hostility of Croats and Serbs against Bosniaks (see 
Torsti 2003: 255).16
 Towards Multi-Perspectivity
As has been shown, while Bosniak and Croat historiographies could hardly 
be more antithetical, the central discursive strategies employed by the his-
torians are similar in many ways. This is particularly true for the discursive 
strategy of linking different historical periods in order to achieve a coher-
ent national narrative that serves present political purposes. This linking is 
used to incorporate the war of 1992–1995 into the meta-narrative, even 
if it is not an explicit subject of discussion, as well as to justify aspirations 
for the nations’ respective futures. In this sense, the way that history is nar-
rated by the historians presented in this chapter is strongly goal-oriented. 
Michael Bakhtin’s notion of chronotope (Bakhtin 1981) is illuminating 
since it pays attention to specific configurations of the time/space rela-
tionship in discourse and ‘(…) the artful interwining of chronotopes can 
create discursive connections among moments presumed to be differently 
located in time and space’ (French 2012: 346). As Bauman reminds us: 
‘Connecting events that are separated in time and often space involves an 
active social process of extracting discourse from one setting and inserting 
it into a new setting’ (Bauman 1986: 22).
Besides linking different chronotopes, discursive strategies of claim-
ing authority and objectivity over history were enacted at both the 
Bosniak- and the Croat-dominated universities. Rather than providing 
sources on which a specific interpretation is based, the lecturers made 
claims that were based on their own authoritative position as historians. 
The lecturers largely gave direct instructions to the students on how 
local history should be understood. Rather than being based on a critical 
16 Such strategies are also prominent in textbooks of other similarly divided societies. In Greek and 
Turkish Cypriot textbooks, for example, national narratives present the future as historically deter-
mined (Papadakis 2008).
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reading of texts, the lecturers gave the students ‘historical facts’. This is 
the way that history is taught to younger pupils as well, as I learned dur-
ing a workshop on multi-perspective textbook writing organised by the 
OSCE together with the Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook 
Research. History textbooks used in BiH are often written in an ency-
clopaedic style (listing historical ‘facts’) and do not encourage pupils 
and teachers to engage with different perspectives of historical events. 
There is little room for either interpretation or  discussion, and the his-
tory of everyday life (e.g., from the period of Tito’s Yugoslavia) is entirely 
excluded from most textbooks.
This workshop had invited potential history textbook authors who were 
interested to rethink traditional textbook writing and to investigate new 
ways of teaching history (see Stradling 2001, 2005). Its main aim was to 
discuss multi-perspectivity in textbooks, the goal of which was to create 
room for discussion in the classroom and enable students to judge where 
to locate historical truth themselves.17 Although university students are 
sometimes invited to participate in such discussions in their classrooms, 
they are quickly reprimanded if their representations of history do not 
correspond with the one authorised by the lecturer. Notwithstanding this 
bias, or perhaps precisely because of it, the objectivity of historiography 
is constantly emphasised by Bosniak and Croat historians. Nationalising 
the past goes hand in hand with a coherent authoritarian narration, 
which does not allow any room for multi-perspectivity.
Even if in this chapter the Bosniak and Croat public dominant dis-
courses were discussed separately from the narratives of the three genera-
tions, I am by no means suggesting that we can clearly delineate between 
the two types of narration. The differentiation I make is an analytical 
rather than a real one, as it were. As pointed out in the Introduction, 
the differentiation between discursive strategies (identified in the domi-
nant public discourses) and discursive tactics (identified in the narratives 
17 One project aiming for multi-perspectivity was initiated in 2003 by a group of historians from 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia under the umbrella of EUROCLIO (the European 
Association of History Educators) and resulted in a joint textbook Obični ljudi u neobičnoj zemlji, 
svakodnevni život u Bosni i Hercegovini, Hrvatskoj i Srbiji 1945–1990. Jugoslavija između Istoka i 
Zapada (Ordinary People in an Extraordinary Country—Every Day Life in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Croatia and Serbia 1945–1990. Yugoslavia between East and West). In a conversation with one of 
the authors, I was told that until today only a small number of copies have found their way into the 
classroom.
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of  the  three generations) makes clear that individuals who are not pro-
fessionally involved in (re-)writing the past locate their narratives and 
interpretations of the past in a field predefined by the dominant public 
discourse, but at the same time they are not fully determined by it. There 
is no direct transmission between teachers/professors and pupils/students 
nor is there a direct transmission of ‘collective memories’ from genera-
tion to generation. As will be shown in the following chapters, individ-
uals make use of the dominant public discourses in different ways and 
their narratives are never independent from them (even if they position 
themselves strongly against them). The process of making meaning of 
past events and periods is socio-culturally situated and is always co- 
constructed and dialogical (Bakhtin 1981). Personal narratives are informed 
(but not determined) by current dominant public discourses as well as by 
past dominant public discourses that individuals of different generations 
have been exposed to (particularly during formative and educative years).
Even if this means that personal narratives cannot be neatly separated 
from the dominant public discourses promoted by professionals involved 
in the ‘national project’, an analytical differentiation helps to carve out the 
particular ways by which individuals of different generational positioning 
reposition themselves vis-à-vis the past after great political changes have 
occurred. Moreover, it allows us to take into consideration the impact on 
and responses to dominant public discourses by individuals, who draw 
on a specific range of personal experiences and share a certain stage of life, 
a certain life situation.
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